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Abstract
We consider problems of two-user secret key generation through an intermediate relay. Each user
observes correlated source sequences and communicates to the relay over rate-limited noiseless links. The
relay processes and broadcasts information to the two users over another rate-limited link. The users then
generate a common secret key based on their sources and information from the relay. In the untrusted
relay setting, the goal is to establish key agreement between the two users at the highest key rate without
leaking information about the key to the relay. We characterize inner and outer bounds to the optimal
tradeoff between communication and key rates. The inner bound is based on the scheme which involves
a combination of binning, network coding, and key aggregation techniques. For the trusted relay setting
with a public broadcast link, the optimal communication-key rate tradeoff is provided for a special case
where the two sources are available losslessly at the relay. The results can be relevant for cloud-based
secret key generation services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud-based services have gained significant interests with a growing adoption for both personal and
business uses. The main idea involves shifting computational tasks traditionally done at user’s devices
to the cloud server/processor which is accessible through some communication channels. This approach
has enabled several functionalities especially for small and less powerful devices. Despite its usefulness,
serious concerns regarding information security and privacy arise due to the fact that information available
at the cloud server could be undesirably exploited.
In this work, we consider one particular cloud-based service, namely secret key generation of two users.
The two users have individual access to two correlated sources and communicate separately to the cloud
server (the relay) who then processes received information and sends back a common broadcast message
to the received users to complete the key generation process. This type of cloud-based services is relevant
in scenarios where the communication between users must occur through some network infrastructure. For
example, in today’s Internet, the communication between two users occurs typically through routers. Our
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Fig. 1. Secret key generation through an untrusted relay.
model applies immediately to such a scenario, by forcing the relay to simply rebroadcast the two messages
sent by the users. Including some computing capability at the relay (namely, “cloud computing”), the
tradeoff between communication and common key rate can be improved. However, when the relay is
involved in the key generation process, it can also gain knowledge of the users’ common key, which is
then no longer secure. This motivates our problem formulation in terms of secret key generation through
an untrusted relay, as shown in Fig. 1. The security constraint is reflected by the requirement that the
information leakage rate at the relay should be kept arbitrarily small.
In this work, we characterize inner and outer bounds to the optimal tradeoff region of communica-
tion rates and key rate. The inner bound is based on an achievability scheme which involves a novel
combination of binning, network coding, and key aggregation techniques.
It is also interesting to consider the case where the relay is trustworthy but its broadcast communication
to the users is over a public channel, as shown in Fig. 3. In this case, we provide a complete charac-
terization of the communication-key rate region for a special case where the two sources are available
directly at the relay.
Our problem is closely related to works on secret key agreement over public communications, intro-
duced in [1], [2]. It is also related to the problem of secret key generation with a helper [3] where the
helper provides rate-limited side information to both users. In our problem, the broadcast information
from the relay may be considered as helper information. However, this information is a function of
users’ own information rather than that of another correlated source at the helper. In this sense, the key
generation process involves some “feedback” information. Other related works on multi-terminal secret
key generation include, e.g., [4]–[7]. From a network topology viewpoint, our problem is also related to
two-way source coding through a relay [8] which has a different goal of reconstructing the other user’s
source sequence with the help of a relay. This include the special cases [9], [10] which consider the
3broadcast phase assuming that the relay knows both sources. Another view of establishing secret key
agreement is through secure message transmission. Related works involving the untrusted relay include,
e.g., [11]–[14].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we consider the untrusted relay setting
and present inner and outer bounds to the communication-key rate region. A Gaussian example is also
discussed. Section III considers an extension where two users observe some common component and can
therefore utilize it for secret key generation. Lastly, in Section IV, we consider the trusted relay setting
with a public broadcast link. All notations follow standard ones in [15].
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION THROUGH AN UNTRUSTED RELAY
A. Problem Formulation
Let us consider secret key generation through a relay as depicted in Fig. 1. Source alphabets X ,Y are
finite sets. Let (Xn, Y n) be n-length sequences which have i.i.d. components distributed according to
some fixed joint distribution PX,Y .
The rate-limited descriptions W1 and W2 are generated based on Xn and Y n, respectively. The relay,
after receiving (W1,W2), generates another rate-limited description Wc and broadcasts it to both users.
User 1 generates the key K1 based on Xn and Wc, while User 2 generates the key K2 based on Y n and
Wc. The goal is to establish key agreement between two users, i.e., K1 = K2, with the highest key rate
while preserving privacy of the key by limiting the key leakage rate at the relay 1nI(K1,K2;W1,W2) to
a negligible level.
We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff among the communication rates of different
rate-limited links and the resulting key rate.
Definition 1: A (|W(n)1 |, |W(n)2 |, |W(n)c |, |K(n)|, n)-code for secret key generation through a relay con-
sists of
• an encoder f (n)1 : X n →W(n)1 ,
• an encoder f (n)2 : Yn →W(n)2 ,
• a relay mapping f (n)r :W(n)1 ×W(n)2 →W(n)c ,
• a decoder g(n)1 :W(n)c ×X n → K(n),
• a decoder g(n)2 :W(n)c × Yn → K(n). ♦
Definition 2: A rate tuple (R1, R2, Rc, Rk) ∈ R4+ is said to be achievable if, for any δ > 0 there exists
4a sequence of (|W(n)1 |, |W(n)2 |, |W(n)c |, |K(n)|, n)-codes such that, for all sufficiently large n,
Pr(K1 6= K2) ≤ δ (1)
1
n
log
∣∣W(n)i ∣∣ ≤ Ri + δ, i = 1, 2, c (2)
1
n
H(K1) ≥ Rk − δ, (3)
1
n
I(K1,K2;W1,W2) ≤ δ. (4)
The communication-key rate region R is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate tuples.♦
B. Results
We provide inner and outer bounds for the communication-key rate region below.
Theorem 1 (Inner Bound): An inner bound Rin to the communication-key rate region is given as the
convex hull of a set of all tuples (R1, R2, Rc, Rk) ∈ R4+ satisfying
R1 ≥ I(X;U1|Y ) (5)
R2 ≥ I(Y ;U2|X) (6)
Rc ≥ max{I(X;U1|Y ), I(Y ;U2|X)} (7)
Rk ≤ I(Y ;U1) + I(X;U2)− I(U1;U2) (8)
= I(X,Y ;U1, U2)− I(X;U1|Y )− I(Y ;U2|X), (9)
for some PX,Y PU1|XPU2|Y with |U1| ≤ |X |+ 1 and |U2| ≤ |Y|+ 1.
Proof: The proof idea is based on an achievable scheme which combines binning, network coding,
and key aggregation techniques. Each user compresses its source sequence using the Wyner-Ziv coding
[16] while treating the other source as side information. The relay simply combines two bin indices using
index splitting and network coding techniques and broadcasts it to the two users. Each user, given the
information from the relay and the observed source sequence, decodes the codeword chosen by the other
user. The secret key is then formed as an aggregation of two partial codeword indices, one from his/her
own codeword and another from the decoded codeword. Details of the proof are given in Appendix A.
Remark 1: 1) Since each user knows its chosen codeword, the relay only needs to send a modulo
sum of the partial indices for successful decoding at the users. This simple network coding technique
at the relay helps to reduce the required rate Rc.
52) The key generation process is done by concatenating two partial codeword indices to form a secret
key. This process can provide a high total key rate and is justified by the “independence” property
of the two partial keys as shown in Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 1.
3) The key rate expression in (8) appears to be less than the sum of key rates achievable from the
one-way communication scheme, i.e., I(Y ;U1)+I(X;U2). Intuitively, a reduction I(U1;U2) on the
key rate is to prevent the relay from learning the key completely by decoding the codewords from
a given (W1,W2).
4) Although our problem considers a different communication protocol involving a relay, the key rate
expression in (9) resembles in some sense the secret key capacity in [4], i.e., the joint entropy (rate for
omniscience at some public terminal) minus the rate needed for “communication for omniscience”
at users. In our case, due to the communication constraints, omniscience of the sources is replaced
by that of the codewords (Un1 , U
n
2 ).
Remark 2: When there are no constraints on R1, R2, and Rc, the achievable key rate in Theorem 1
reduces to I(X;Y ). This is in fact the secret key capacity for the classical two-user setting without
communication constraint [1], [2]. It can be obtained by setting U1 = X and U2 = Y in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Outer Bound): An outer bound Rout to the communication-key rate region is given as a
set of all tuples (R1, R2, Rc, Rk) ∈ R4+ satisfying (5)-(7), and
Rk ≤ I(X,Y ;U1, U2)− I(X;U1|Y )− I(Y ;U2|X), (10)
for some PX,Y PU1,U2|X,Y .
Proof: The proof follows from standard properties of the entropy function with Fano’s inequality
H(K1|Wc, Y n) ≤ nn and H(K2|Wc, Xn) ≤ nn and the key leakage constraint (4). The details of the
proof are given in Appendix B.
Remark 3: The rate expressions in Theorems 1 and 2 are the same and the only difference is in
the set of probability distributions. We note that from the problem formulation in Section II-A, K1
and K2 are generated based on both sources and Wc. The dependence of Wc corresponds to utilizing
feedback information which creates difficulty in deriving the tight bound. In particular, the auxiliary
random variables to be defined in the converse proof often contain the key variables which are dependent
of Wc and both sources.
C. Example and Discussion
We consider a Gaussian example of the inner bound given in Theorem 1 and compare it to the results
obtained from a simple one-way setting where the relay only forwards information in one direction. Let
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Fig. 2. Comparison between achievable secret key rate Rk in (11) and a convex combination of C1→2 and C2→1 in (12), i.e.,
C∗ = αC1→2 + (1 − α)C2→1. In (a), we assume that R1 = 0.6, R2 = 0.4, Rc = 1, and ρ = 0.6. In (b), we assume that
R1 = R2 = βRc where Rc = 1 and ρ = 0.6, and here we see that the key rate is saturated at β ≥ 1 as the common rate Rc
becomes a bottleneck.
X
Y
 ∼ N(
0
0
 ,
1 ρ
ρ 1
), where ρ ∈ [0, 1]. We can choose U1 = X +Q1, and U2 = Y +Q2, where
Q1 ∼ N (0, NQ1) and Q2 ∼ N (0, NQ2) are independent of each other and of (X,Y ). It can be shown
that Theorem 1 reduces to the set of (R1, R2, Rc, Rk) such that
Ri ≥ 1
2
log
(1 +NQi − ρ2
NQi
)
, i = 1, 2
Rc ≥ max
{1
2
log
(1 +NQ1 − ρ2
NQ1
)
,
1
2
log
(1 +NQ2 − ρ2
NQ2
)}
Rk ≤ 1
2
log
(
(1 +NQ1)(1 +NQ2)− ρ2
(1 +NQ1 − ρ2)(1 +NQ2 − ρ2)
)
,
for some NQ1 , NQ2 ∈ R+.
Furthermore, by setting NQi =
1−ρ2
22min{Ri,Rc}−1 for i = 1, 2, we have that
Rk ≤ 1
2
log
(
1− ρ22−2(min{R1,Rc}+min{R2,Rc})
1− ρ2
)
. (11)
Note that for the one-way communication system (from i to j), we can derive the expression for the
secret key capacity in terms of communication rates (similarly as in [17]), i.e.,
Ci→j =
1
2
log
(
1− ρ22−2min{Ri,Rc}
1− ρ2
)
, (12)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
7We see that for given (R1, R2, Rc), the maximum achievable key rate in (11) can be strictly larger
than the convex combination of the one-way secret key capacities (see, e.g., Fig. 2 (a) and (b) for simple
illustration). This suggests that there is some benefit in utilizing the communications through a relay in
establishing the secret key agreement as compared to the classical one-way scheme in general.
III. SOURCES WITH COMMON COMPONENTS
Next we consider an extension where we assume that the source sequences consist of a common part
Zn. Without loss of generality, we assume that User 1 observes (Xn, Zn) and User 2 observes (Y n, Zn),
where (Xn, Y n, Zn) are i.i.d. according to PX,Y,Z . The problem formulation for this case is essentially
the same as in the previous section where we replace Xn by (Xn, Zn) and Y n by (Y n, Zn).
It is interesting to see how the users can utilize the common part of the sources for secret key generation.
One simple strategy is to let the users exclusively use the common source Zn to generate the secret key
without sending any information to the relay. This method achieves the secret key rate of H(Z) without
leaking any information. We show that when the sources are conditionally independent, i.e., X −Z − Y
forms a Markov chain, this strategy is in fact optimal. However, in general, the users could benefit if
they communicate through a relay. In this section, we provide an inner bound to the communication-key
rate region. Our achievable scheme is based on the idea of utilizing the common source to generate a
partial key which can be combined with the key generated from the agreement through the relay. The
scheme is a direct extension of that in the previous section. Consequently, the inner bound here recovers
Theorem 1 when Z is constant.
Theorem 3 (Inner Bound): An inner bound Rin,common to the communication-key rate region is given
as the convex hull of a set of all tuples (R1, R2, Rc, Rk) ∈ R4+ satisfying
R1 ≥ I(X;U1|Y,Z) (13)
R2 ≥ I(Y ;U2|X,Z) (14)
Rc ≥ max{I(X;U1|Y, Z), I(Y ;U2|X,Z)} (15)
Rk ≤ I(Y,Z;U1) + I(X,Z;U2)− I(U1;U2) +H(Z|U1, U2) (16)
for some PX,Y,ZPU1|X,ZPU2|Y,Z with |U1| ≤ |X ||Z|+ 2 and |U2| ≤ |Y||Z|+ 2.
Proof: The proof idea is based on an extension of the achievable scheme used to prove Theorem 1.
We utilize the common source Zn to generate an additional part of secret key at rate close to H(Z|U1, U2)
and combine it with the key generated as in the previous scheme. The encoding, relay mapping, and
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Fig. 3. Secret key generation through a trusted relay.
decoding processes are similar as before, except that each user operates on the “super-sources” (Xn, Zn)
and (Y n, Zn) instead. In Appendix C, we provide the proof of achievable key rate and analysis of the
key leakage rate.
Corollary 1: If the sources are conditionally independent, i.e., X − Z − Y , we have that the secret
key capacity is given by H(Z). This result is very intuitive since the users observe the common source
Zn, and given Zn, the sources Xn and Y n are independent. Therefore, Xn and Y n do not contribute to
the key generation process. We can simply generate the secret key by using only the common source,
i.e., hashing (binning) the sequence Zn.
IV. TRUSTED RELAY WITH PUBLIC BROADCAST TRANSMISSION
In this section, we consider a new setting of secret key generation through a relay where the relay is
trustworthy but its transmission to the users can be eavesdropped upon by an external passive eavesdrop-
per, as depicted in Fig. 3. The problem formulation remains the same as in the previous one in Section
II-A, except that the constraint on key leakage rate becomes 1nI(K1,K2;Wc) ≤ δ. This constraint can
be seen as a weaker version of (4) since it can be implied by (4).
We note that, by moving the key leakage constraint from the relay, the nature of the problem changes
quite drastically. For instance, it is now possible for the relay to decode some codewords chosen at the
users without violating the key leakage constraint.
A. Result
In the following, we present the communication-key rate region for the special case, depicted in Fig. 4,
where the uplink communications are over links with unlimited capacities, i.e., (Xn, Y n) is available at
the relay.
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Fig. 4. Secret key generation when sources are available at relay.
Theorem 4: The communication-key rate region for the setting in Fig. 4 is the set of all (Rc, Rk) ∈ R2+
such that
Rc ≥ max{I(X;V |Y ), I(Y ;V |X)} (17)
Rk ≤ min{I(X;V ), I(Y ;V )} (18)
for some PX,Y PV |X,Y with |V| ≤ |X ||Y|+ 2.
Proof: The achievability is based on the Wyner-Ziv coding with respect to side information at the
users. The bin index of the codeword is sent over the rate-limited link and the codeword index is selected
as a secret key. With Rc ≥ max{I(X;V |Y ), I(Y ;V |X)}, we ensure that both users can decode the
codeword and therefore agree on the common secret key. The converse follows from the key leakage
rate constraint, Fano’s inequality, and some standard properties of the entropy function. Proof details are
given in Appendix D.
B. Comparison to the Previous Scheme
For the general setting in Fig. 3, in view of minimizing the rates R1 and R2, one may devise a coding
scheme where the first phase of transmission (from the users to the relay) is based on multi-terminal lossy
source coding [18]. The relay, after decoding, can choose another codeword to communicate to users
to establish the secret key generation. If the rates R1 and R2 are sufficiently high, then the first phase
transmission can support lossless reconstruction, i.e., the scheme reduces to the Slepian-Wolf coding [19],
and the relay can now operate directly on the sources as considered in the special case in Section IV-A.
It is however unclear whether this type of scheme where the relay first decodes some codewords is a
good scheme that can achieve the optimal tradeoff in general. For comparison, we discuss the scheme used
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to prove Theorem 1 where the relay does not decode any codeword, but rather employs a network coding
technique to forward information to the users. It can be shown that the inner bound in Theorem 1 also
holds for the trusted relay setting since I(K1,K2;W1,W2) = I(K1,K2;W1,W2,Wc) ≥ I(K1,K2;Wc).
However, when specializing to the case of unlimited uplink rates, the inner bound in Theorem 1 reduces
to the set of (Rc, Rk) satisfying
Rc ≥ max{I(X;U1, U2|Y ), I(Y ;U1, U2|X)},
Rk ≤ I(X;U1, U2)− I(X;U1, U2|Y )
= I(Y ;U1, U2)− I(Y ;U1, U2|X),
for some PX,Y PU1|XPU2|Y .
We see that the region in Theorem 4 is generally larger than the one above. This suggests that for
the trusted relay setting, the scheme where the relay first decodes some codewords can perform better in
general.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof is based on a random coding argument where we follow the definition and properties of
joint typicality in [15].
Codebook generation: Fix PU1|XPU2|Y .
• Randomly and independently generate codewords un1 (w1a, w1b, w1k, w′) each according to PU1 ,
where w1a ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U1|Y )−Rb+2δ)], w1b ∈ [1 : 2nRb ], w1k ∈ [1 : 2nRk1 ], and w′ ∈ [1 :
2n(I(Y ;U1)−Rk1−δ)].
• Randomly and independently generate codewords un2 (w2a, w2b, w2k, w′′) each according to PU2 ,
where w2a ∈ [1 : 2n(I(Y ;U2|X)−Rb+2δ)], w2b ∈ [1 : 2nRb ], w2k ∈ [1 : 2nRk2 ], and w′′ ∈ [1 :
2n(I(X;U2)−Rk2−δ)].
• Let Rb = min{I(X;U1|Y ), I(Y ;U2|X)} and Rk1+Rk2 = I(Y ;U1)+I(X;U2)−I(U1;U2)−δ > 0.
• The codebook is revealed to both users and the relay.
Encoding:
• User 1: Given xn, it looks for a jointly typical un1 . From the covering lemma [15], with high
probability, there exists at least one such codeword. If there are more than one, it selects the one
with the smallest indices. Then it sends the indices (w1a, w1b) to the relay.
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• Encoding for User 2 follows similarly as that for User 1, but with yn and un2 instead of xn and un1 .
Finally, it sends the indices (w2a, w2b) to the relay.
• By the Markov lemma [15], (xn, yn, un1 , un2 ) are jointly typical with high probability.
Relay mapping: Given (w1a, w1b, w2a, w2b), the relay broadcasts wc = (w1a, w1b ⊕ w2b, w2a) back to
the users, where ⊕ denotes the addition over 2nRb field.
Decoding:
• User 1: Given wc and (xn, un1 (w1a, w1b, w1k, w′)), it can decrypt w2b. Then it looks for a unique
(wˆ2k, wˆ
′′) such that un2 is jointly typical with (xn, un1 ). From the packing lemma [15], with high
probability, it finds such a pair and it is the correct pair selected at User 2. User 1 then generates
the key k1 = (w1k, wˆ2k).
• Similarly as User 1, User 2 finds a unique (wˆ1k, wˆ′) and generates the key as k2 = (wˆ1k, w2k). With
high probability, k1 = k2 = (w1k, w2k).
Let Un1 (W1a,W1b,W1k,W
′) and Un2 (W2a,W2b,W2k,W ′′) be the chosen codewords in the encoding pro-
cess. From the LLN, we have that sequences (Xn, Y n, Un1 (W1a,W1b,W1k,W
′), Un2 (W2a,W2b,W2k,W ′′))
are jointly typical with high probability.
Analysis of key leakage: Let W1 = (W1a,W1b) and W2 = (W2a,W2b). The key leakage averaged over
all randomly chosen codebooks can be bounded as follows:
I(K1,K2;W1,W2) = I(W1k,W2k;W1,W2)
≤ H(W1k,W2k)− I(W1k,W2k;Xn, Y n|W1,W2)
≤ H(W1k,W2k)−H(Xn, Y n) +H(W1,W2) +H(Xn, Y n|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′)
+H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k)
(a)
≤ n(I(Y ;U1) + I(X;U2)− I(U1;U2)− δ)− nH(X,Y ) + n(I(X;U1|Y ) + 2δ)
+ n(I(Y ;U2|X) + 2δ) + n(H(X,Y |U1, U2) + δ) + nn
(b)
≤ nδ′,
where (a) follows from the codebook generation, from the bound H(Xn, Y n|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′) ≤
n(H(X,Y |U1, U2)+δ) which follows from properties of jointly typical sequences (the proof is given
in Appendix E), and from Fano’s inequality H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k) ≤ nn which holds since
given (W1,W2,W1k,W2k), the codewords (Un1 , U
n
2 ) and thus (W
′,W ′′) can be decoded successfully
with high probability (the mutual packing lemma [15]). Lastly, (b) follows from U1 −X − Y − U2.
Before proceeding to the analysis of an achievable key rate, we provide a lemma which states the
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“independence” property of the two index parts (W1k,W2k) that form a secret key.
Lemma 1: With the achievable scheme and codebook generated as described above, we have that
I(W1k;W2k) ≤ nδ.
The proof of the lemma is given as follows:
I(W1k;W2k) ≤ H(W1k)− I(W1k;Xn|W2k)
= H(W1k)−H(Xn)−H(W2k|Xn) +H(W2k) +H(Xn|W1k,W2k,W1,W2,W ′,W ′′)
+ I(Xn;W1,W2,W
′,W ′′|W1k,W2k)
(a)
≤ H(W1k)−H(Xn)−H(W2k|Xn) +H(W2k) + n(H(X|U1, U2) + δ)
+H(W1,W2,W
′,W ′′|W1k,W2k)−H(W1,W2,W ′,W ′′|W1k,W2k, Xn)
(b)
≤ H(W1k)−H(Xn)− I(W2k;Y n|Xn) +H(W2k) + n(H(X|U1, U2) + δ) +H(W1,W2|W1k,W2k)
+ nn − I(W2,W ′′;Y n|W2k, Xn)
(c)
≤ H(W1k) +H(W2k)−H(Xn, Y n) + n(H(X|U1, U2) + δ) +H(W1) +H(W2) + nn
+ n(H(Y |U2, X) + δ)
(d)
= H(W1k) +H(W2k)− nI(X,Y ;U1, U2) +H(W1) +H(W2) + nδ′
(e)
≤ nδ′′ ,
where (a) follows from the bound on the conditional entropy term H(Xn|W1k,W2k,W1,W2,W ′,W ′′) ≤
n(H(X|U1, U2)+δ) (see, e.g., Appendix E), (b) follows from Fano’s inequality H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k) ≤
nn and the fact that (W1,W1k,W ′) is a function of Xn, (c) follows from the bound H(Y n|W2,W2k,W ′′, Xn) ≤
n(H(Y |U2, X)+ δ) (see, e.g., Appendix E), (d) follows from the Markov chain U1− (X,U2)−Y , and
(e) follows from the codebook generation.
Next we provide the analysis of achievable key rate.
H(K1) = H(W1k,W2k)
(a)
≥ H(W1k) +H(W2k)− nδ
≥ H(W1k,W1,W ′)−H(W1)−H(W ′) +H(W2k,W2,W ′′)−H(W2)−H(W ′′)− nδ
(b)
≥ H(Un1 )−H(W1)−H(W ′) +H(Un2 )−H(W2)−H(W ′′)− nδ
(c)
≥ n(I(X;U1) + δ)−H(W1)−H(W ′) + n(I(Y ;U2) + δ)−H(W2)−H(W ′′)− nδ
(d)
≥ n(I(Y ;U1) + I(X;U2)− I(U1;U2)− δ′) ≥ n(Rk − δ′)
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if Rk ≤ I(Y ;U1) + I(X;U2)− I(U1;U2), where (a) follows from Lemma 1, (b) follows from the fact
that given the codebook, Un1 is a function of (W1k,W1,W
′), and similarly for Un2 , (c) follows from the
encoding processes where Pr(Un1 = u
n
1 ) ≤ 2−n(I(X;U1)−δ) and Pr(Un2 = un2 ) ≤ 2−n(I(Y ;U2)−δ), and (d)
follows from the codebook generation. The cardinality bound can be proved using the support lemma
(see, e.g., [15]).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let U1,i = (K1,W2,Wc, Y i−1) and U2,i = (K2,W1,Wc, Xi−1). For any achievable rate tuple (R1, R2, Rc, Rk),
it follows that
nR1 ≥ H(W1) ≥ H(W1|Y n)−H(W1,K1|Xn, Y n)
= H(W1,K1|Y n)−H(K1|W1, Y n)−H(W1,K1|Xn, Y n)
(a)
≥ I(W1,K1;Xn|Y n)− nn
(b)
= H(Xn|Y n)−H(Xn|W1,W2,Wc,K1, Y n)− nn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;U1,i|Yi)− nn,
where (a) follows from the fact that W2 is a function of Y n and that Wc is a function of (W1,W2). Then
by Fano’s inequality, we have H(K1|Wc, Y n) ≤ nn, (b) follows from the fact that W2 is a function of
Y n and that Wc is a function of (W1,W2), and (c) follows from the definition of U1,i.
Similarly,
nR2 ≥ H(W2) ≥ H(W2|Xn)−H(W2,K2|Xn, Y n)
= H(W2,K2|Xn)−H(K2|W2, Xn)−H(W2,K2|Xn, Y n)
(a)
≥ I(W2,K2;Y n|Xn)− nn
(b)
= H(Y n|Xn)−H(Y n|W1,W2,Wc,K2, Xn)− nn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;U2,i|Xi)− nn,
where (a) follows from the fact that W1 is a function of Xn and that Wc is a function of (W1,W2). Then
by Fano’s inequality, we have H(K2|Wc, Xn) ≤ nn, (b) follows from the fact that W1 is a function of
Xn and that Wc is a function of (W1,W2), and (c) follows from the definition of U2,i.
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Next,
nRc ≥ H(Wc) ≥ H(Wc|Y n)−H(Wc,K1|Xn, Y n)
(a)
≥ I(Wc,K1;Xn|Y n)− nn
(b)
= H(Xn|Y n)−H(Xn|Wc,K1,W2, Y n)− nn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;U1,i|Yi)− nn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality H(K1|Wc, Y n) ≤ nn, (b) follows from the fact that W2 is a
function of Y n, and (c) follows from the definition of U1,i. And similarly,
nRc ≥ H(Wc) ≥ H(Wc|Xn)−H(Wc,K2|Xn, Y n)
(a)
≥ I(Wc,K2;Y n|Xn)− nn
(b)
= H(Y n|Xn)−H(Y n|Wc,K2,W1, Xn)− nn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;U2,i|Xi)− nn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality H(K2|Wc, Xn) ≤ nn, (b) follows from the fact that W1 is a
function of Xn, and (c) follows from the definition of U2,i.
Lastly,
nRk ≤ H(K1) ≤ H(K1,K2) = H(K1,K2,W1,W2)−H(W1,W2|K1,K2)
≤ I(K1,K2,W1,W2;Xn, Y n)−H(W1,W2|K1,K2)
(a)
≤ I(K1,K2,W1,W2;Xn, Y n)−H(W1,W2) + nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;U1,i, U2,1)−H(W1)−H(W2) + I(W1;W2) + nδn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;U1,i, U2,1)−H(W1|Y n)− I(W1;Y n) +H(W1,K1|Xn, Y n)−H(W2|Xn)
− I(W2;Xn) +H(W2,K2|Xn, Y n) + I(W1;W2) + nδn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;U1,i, U2,1)− I(Xi;U1,i|Yi)− I(Yi;U2,i|Xi)− I(W1;Y n)− I(W2;Xn) + I(W1;W2) + nδn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;U1,i, U2,1)− I(Xi;U1,i|Yi)− I(Yi;U2,i|Xi) + nδn,
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where (a) follows from the key leakage constraint, (b) follows from the fact that Wc is a function of
(W1,W2) and the definitions of U1,i and U2,i, (c) follows from the bounds on R1 and R2 above, and
(d) follows from the bound −I(W1;Y n)− I(W2;Xn)+ I(W1;W2) ≤ 0 which holds due to the Markov
chain W1 − Y n −W2.
The proof ends by standard steps of introducing a time-sharing random variable and letting n→∞.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF ACHIEVABLE KEY RATE AND ANALYSIS OF KEY LEAKAGE RATE IN THEOREM 3
In the codebook generation, generating codewords un1 and u
n
2 with appropriate sizes similarly as in
the proof of Theorem 1, i.e.,
• Randomly and independently generate codewords un1 (w1a, w1b, w1k, w′) each according to PU1 ,
where w1a ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U1|Y,Z)−Rb+2δ)], w1b ∈ [1 : 2nRb ], w1k ∈ [1 : 2nRk1 ], and w′ ∈ [1 :
2n(I(Y,Z;U1)−Rk1−δ)].
• Randomly and independently generate codewords un2 (w2a, w2b, w2k, w′′) each according to PU2 ,
where w2a ∈ [1 : 2n(I(Y ;U2|X,Z)−Rb+2δ)], w2b ∈ [1 : 2nRb ], w2k ∈ [1 : 2nRk2 ], and w′′ ∈ [1 :
2n(I(X,Z;U2)−Rk2−δ)].
• Let Rb = min{I(X;U1|Y,Z), I(Y ;U2|X,Z)} and Rk1 + Rk2 = I(Y, Z;U1) + I(X,Z;U2) −
I(U1;U2)− δ > 0.
Apart from that, we also partition the set Zn by distributing sequences zn ∈ Zn uniformly at random
into 2nRk,z equal-sized bins, where Rk,z = H(Z|U1, U2) − 2δ. Each user, knowing zn, can find the
corresponding bin index containing zn and set it to be a partial key Kz . Following the similar coding
scheme for Theorem 1, we let Un1 (W1a,W1b,W1k,W
′) and Un2 (W2a,W2b,W2k,W ′′) be the codewords
selected by Users 1 and 2, where (W1k,W2k) eventually forms another partial key. Finally, the secret
key is chosen to be (W1k,W2k,Kz).
Below we show that with the appropriate size of the codebook above, the resulting key leakage rate
is negligible.
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Key leakage analysis: Let W1 = (W1a,W1b) and W2 = (W2a,W2b). The key leakage averaged over
all randomly chosen codebooks can be bounded as follows:
I(K1,K2;W1,W2) = I(W1k,W2k,Kz;W1,W2)
≤ H(W1k,W2k,Kz)− I(W1k,W2k,Kz;Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2)
≤ H(W1k,W2k,Kz)−H(Xn, Y n, Zn) +H(W1,W2) +H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,Kz)
(a)
≤ n(I(Y,Z;U1) + I(X,Z;U2)− I(U1;U2)− δ) + nRk,z − nH(X,Y, Z) + n(I(X;U1|Y,Z) + 2δ)
+ n(I(Y ;U2|X,Z) + 2δ) + n(H(X,Y, Z|U1, U2)−Rk,z + δ′)
(b)
≤ nδ′′ ,
where in (a), we use the property of the codebook, and Lemma 2 below, and (b) follows from the Markov
chain U2 − (Y,Z)− (X,U1).
Lemma 2: From the codebook generation given above, if Pr((Xn, Y n, Zn, Un1 , U
n
2 ) ∈ T (n) (X,Y, Z, U1, U2))→
1 as n→∞, we have that H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,Kz) ≤ n(H(X,Y, Z|U1, U2)−Rk,z+ δ′).
Proof: We consider the following bound:
H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,Kz)
= H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,Kz,W ′,W ′′) + I(Xn, Y n, Zn;W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,Kz)
≤ H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′,Kz) +H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k)
≤ H(Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′,Kz) +H(Xn, Y n|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′, Zn)
+H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k)
≤ n(H(Z|U1, U2)−Rk,z + δ) + n(H(X,Y |U1, U2, Z) + δ) + nn
= n(H(X,Y, Z|U1, U2)−Rk,z + δ′),
where the last inequality follows from the bound H(Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′,Kz) ≤ n(H(Z|U1, U2)−
Rk,z + δ) (see e.g., [20, Lemma 3]) which holds for Rk,z ≤ H(Z|U1, U2) − δ, from the bound
H(Xn, Y n|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′, Zn) ≤ n(H(X,Y |U1, U2, Z) + δ) which follows from prop-
erties of jointly typical sequences (a similar proof can be found in Appendix E below), and from
Fano’s inequality H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2,W1k,W2k) ≤ nn which holds since given the codebook and
(W1,W2,W1k,W2k), the codewords (Un1 , U
n
2 ) and thus (W
′,W ′′) can be decoded with high probability
(the mutual packing lemma [15]).
17
Next, we consider the key rate analysis.
H(K1) = H(W1k,W2k,Kz)
= H(W1k,W2k) +H(Kz|W1k,W2k)
≥ H(W1k,W2k) + I(Kz;Xn, Y n, Zn|W1k,W2k)
≥ H(Xn, Y n, Zn)−H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1k,W2k,Kz)
= H(Xn, Y n, Zn)−H(Xn, Y n, Zn|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,Kz)− I(Xn, Y n, Zn;W1,W2|W1k,W2k,Kz)
(a)
≥ nH(X,Y, Z)− n(H(X,Y, Z|U1, U2)−Rk,z + δ′)−H(W1)−H(W2)
(b)
≥ n(I(X,Y, Z;U1, U2)− I(X;U1|Y, Z)− I(Y ;U2|X,Z) +H(Z|U1, U2)− δ′′ )
(c)
= n(I(Y, Z;U1) + I(X,Z;U2)− I(U1;U2) +H(Z|U1, U2)− δ′′ ),
where (a) follows from Lemma 2, (b) follows from the codebook generation, and (c) follows from the
Markov chain U2 − (Y,Z)− (X,U1).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Sketch of achievability: For codebook generation, randomly and independently generate codewords
vn(wc, w
′) each∼ PV , where wc ∈ [1 : 2n(max{I(X;V |Y ),I(Y ;V |X)}+2δ)] and w′ ∈ [1 : 2n(min{I(X;V ),I(Y ;V )}−δ)].
For encoding, given (xn, yn), the relay finds a jointly typical codeword vn and sends the corresponding
bin index wc to the users. The secret key is chosen as w′. With high probability, both users, given wc
and its source, can decode vn, and thus w′ correctly. The key leakage averaged over all randomly chosen
codebooks can be bounded as follows:
I(K1,K2;Wc) = I(W
′;Wc)
≤ H(Wc)− I(Wc;Xn, Y n|W ′)
≤ H(Wc)−H(Xn, Y n) +H(W ′) +H(Xn, Y n|Wc,W ′)
(a)
≤ n(I(X,Y ;V ) + δ)− nH(X,Y ) + n(H(X,Y |V ) + δ)
= nδ′,
where (a) follows from the codebook generation and the bound H(Xn, Y n|Wc,W ′) ≤ n(H(X,Y |V )+
δ) (which can be shown similarly as in the proof in Appendix E below).
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Then we have that
H(K1) = H(W
′) ≥ H(W ′|Wc)
= H(Wc,W
′)−H(Wc)
(a)
≥ H(V n)−H(Wc)
(b)
≥ n(I(X,Y ;V )− δ)− n(max{I(X;V |Y ), I(Y ;V |X)}+ 2δ)
= n(min{I(X;V ), I(Y ;V )} − δ′)
≥ n(Rk − δ′)
if Rk ≤ min{I(X;V ), I(Y ;V )}, where (a) follows from the fact that given the codebook V n is a function
of (Wc,W ′), and (b) follows from the encoding processes where Pr(V n = vn) ≤ 2−n(I(X,Y ;V )−δ) and
from the codebook generation.
Converse: Let Vi = (Wc,K1,K2, Xi−1, Y i−1). For any achievable (Rc, Rk), it follows that
nRc ≥ H(Wc)
≥ H(Wc|Y n)−H(Wc,K1,K2|Xn, Y n)
(a)
≥ I(Wc,K1,K2;Xn|Y n)− nn
(b)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi|Yi)− nn,
where (a) follows from the fact that K2 is a function of (Wc, Y n) and Fano’s inequality H(K1|Wc, Y n) ≤
nn, and (b) follows from the definition of Vi.
By symmetry, it also follows that nRc ≥
∑n
i=1 I(Yi;Vi|Xi)− nn.
For the key rate, it follows that
nRk ≤ H(K1) ≤ H(K1,K2)
(a)
≤ H(K1,K2|Wc) + nδn
(b)
≤ I(K1,K2;Y n|Wc) + nδn + nn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Vi) + nδn + nn,
where (a) follows from the key leakage constraint, (b) follows from the fact that K2 is a function of
(Wc, Y
n) and Fano’s inequality H(K1|Wc, Y n) ≤ nn, and (c) follows from the definition of Vi.
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Similarly, by symmetry, it also follows that nRk ≤
∑n
i=1 I(Xi;Vi) + nδn + nn. The proof ends by
standard steps of introducing a time-sharing random variable and letting n→∞.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF BOUND ON CONDITIONAL ENTROPY
H(Xn, Y n|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′) ≤ n(H(X,Y |U1, U2) + δ)
Let E be a binary random variable taking value 0 if (Xn, Y n, Un1 (W1,W1k,W
′), Un2 (W2,W2k,W ′′)) ∈
T (n) , and 1 otherwise. Since (Xn, Y n, Un1 , Un2 ) ∈ T (n) with high probability from the encoding process,
then Pr(E = 1) ≤ δ. We have that
H(Xn, Y n|W1,W2,W1k,W2k,W ′,W ′′)
(a)
≤ H(Xn, Y n, E|Un1 (W1,W1k,W ′), Un2 (W2,W2k,W ′′))
≤ H(Xn, Y n|Un1 , Un2 , E) +H(E)
= Pr(E = 0)H(Xn, Y n|Un1 , Un2 , E = 0) + Pr(E = 1)H(Xn, Y n|Un1 , Un2 , E = 1) +H(E)
(b)
≤ H(Xn, Y n|Un1 , Un2 , E = 0) + δH(Xn, Y n) + h(δ)
≤ H(Xn, Y n|Un1 , Un2 , E = 0) + nδ log |X ||Y|+ h(δ)
≤
∑
(un1 ,u
n
2 )∈T (n)
p(un1 , u
n
2 |E = 0) ·H(Xn, Y n|Un1 = un1 , Un2 = un2 , E = 0) + nδ′
(c)
≤
∑
(un1 ,u
n
2 )∈T (n)
p(un1 , u
n
2 |E = 0) log |T (n) (X,Y |un1 , un2 )|+ nδ′
(d)
≤ n(H(X,Y |U1, U2) + δ′),
where step (a) follows from the fact that given the codebook, Un1 and U
n
2 are functions of (W1,W1k,W
′)
and (W2,W2k,W ′′), (b) follows from Pr(E = 1) ≤ δ where h(·) is the binary entropy function, and
(c) and (d) follow from the properties of jointly typical set [15] with δ, δ′ → 0 as → 0, and → 0 as
n→∞.
We note that similar proofs can be obtained for other conditional entropy bounds of this form, e.g.,
H(Xn|W1k,W2k,W1,W2,W ′,W ′′) ≤ n(H(X|U1, U2) + δ)
and
H(Y n|W2,W2k,W ′′, Xn) ≤ n(H(Y |U2, X) + δ)
which appear in achievability proof in the paper.
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